A Negotiation Support System based on a Multi-agent System speci city and preference relations on arguments by Morge, Maxime & Beaune, Philippe
A Negotiation Support System based
on a Multi-agent System
specificity and preference relations on arguments
Maxime MORGE, Philippe BEAUNE
E´cole Nationale Supe´rieure des Mines de Saint Etienne
158 cours Fauriel, 42000 Saint Etienne (France)
{morge,beaune}@emse.fr
http://www.emse.fr/~mmorge
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a Negotiation Support System
based on a Multi-agent System. Each agent assists a user in multi-criteria
decision making and negotiates according to this decision-modelling with
other agents, each of them representing a user. Moreover agents assist
users in the debate to negotiate a joint representation of the problem
and automatically justify proposals with this joint representation.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a Group Deciding Support System which could be used
in environment planning by the elect, civil society and experts. This software,
a groupware, drives rational decisions according to governance principles. More
pluralistic than hierarchic, it guarantees the readability in the choice made by
all between creative solutions. Moreover, users are really assisted and need no
ability in Computer Science.
A Negotiation Support System provides three kinds of functionality. Firstly,
it facilitates the exchange of information among users (ex: Zeno1) Secondly, it
provides decision-modelling or group-decision techniques to reduce the noise and
uncertainty that occur in the process of asynchronous telecooperation (ex :GDSS-
DMI2). Finally, it provides negotiation support. The field of Artificial Intelligence
in particular multi-agent methods can be useful for negotiation support. In this
paper, we use these technics to detect the sources of conflict. Interaction between
users is used to clarify conflicts.
This system is inspired by the group choice design support system which
was proposed by Takayuki Ito and Toramatsu Shintani [3, 4]. It is based on
multi-agent negotiation. Figure 1 shows the system architecture. Each agent as-
sists a user in the multi-criteria decision making and negotiates according to
this decision-modelling with other agents, each of them representing an user.
1 http://www.ais.fraunhofer.de/MS/results/results-zeno.html
2 http://gdss-dmi.uqam.ca/gdss-dmi/
All agents are registered by a middle agent transmitting proposals and counter-
proposals to other agents. This system provides addition functionalities to nego-
tiate a joint representation of the problem and to automatically justify proposals
based on this joint representation.
Fig. 1. System Architecture
The decision support tools are described in section 2. The multiagent negoti-
ation is presented in section 3. Section 4 explains how negotiation is supported.
2 Decision support
Multi-criteria analysis is useful for land-use management. The Analytic Hierar-
chy Process (AHP) [7] is a powerful and flexible decision making process to help
people set priorities and make the best decision when both qualitative and its
quantitative aspects of a decision need to be considered.
The agent assists user in the three steps of this procedure: the definition
of the problem structure, the pairwise comparison between elements and the
synthesis of preferences.
2.1 First step: constructing
decision hierarchy
To obtain a good representation of a problem, it has to be structured into differ-
ent components called activities. Figure 2 shows that the goal of the problem
(G =”to lay out a highway”) is addressed by some alternatives (A = a1, a2, a3)
i.e. possible solutions. The problem is split into sub-problems (c1, c2) which are
criteria evaluating alternatives. These criteria (C) are split in sub-criteria and,
recursively split to finally obtain the leaf criteria of a decision hierarchy
i.e. a taxonomy of criteria. A specificity relation over criteria is defined as:
ck1 / ck2 iff ck1 is a sub-criterium of ck2. The corresponding transitive closure is
noted by /∗.
Fig. 2. Decision hierarchy to lay out an highway
After develop the hierarchy using the graphical user interface, the user weights
the relative importance of all elements.
2.2 Second step: making judgments
The user have to make pairwise comparisons between similar activities on the
same level with respect to the activity on the upper level to evaluate the relative
importance of one element over another with respect to a property. The rela-
tive importance could be: equal (1), moderate (3), strong (5), very strong and
demonstrated (7) or extreme (9). Sometimes one needs compromise judgments
(2, 4, 6, 8) or reciprocal values (1/9, 1/8, 1/7, 1/6, 1/5, 1/4, 1/3, 1/2). For pairwise
comparisons between n similar activities with respect to the criterium ck, a ma-
trix Ack = (aij)i,j≤n is a preferred form. Each element evaluates the relative
importance of one activity i over another activity j (aij = wiwj ).
Some proprieties of this pairwise comparison matrix: identity, reciprocity,
default values reduce user’s effort to inform all pairwise comparisons. The next
step synthesizes judgments and allows to know how good the consistency is.
2.3 Third step: judgments synthesis and consistency measurement
If n is the size of the pairwise comparison matrix Ack = (aij)i,j≤n, and λmax the
max eigen-value, the eigenvector which is associated represents the priorities of
the activities with respect to ck (Wck = (wi)i≤n).
Of course, a minimal degree of consistency in setting priorities for elements
with respect to some criteria is necessary to get valid results in the real world.
The consistency index of a pairwise comparison matrix Ack is defined as fol-
lows: CIAck =
λmax−n
(n−1) . RCn is the random consistency for n-order pairwise
comparison matrix where values are randomized. The AHP measures the overall
consistency of judgments by means a consistency ratio: CRAck = CIAck /RCn.
The higher consistency ratio is, the less consistent preferences are. The value of
the consistency ratio should be 10% or less (in fact 5% for a 3 × 3 matrix, 9%
for a 4× 4 and 10% for a larger matrix) [7].
Under condition of consistency, the priorities can be calculated.
– I, the priority of a criterium with respect to the criterium on the upper level:
I : C − {co} × C → [0; 1]
(ci, cj) 7−→ I(ci|cj) = wi ∈Wcj if ci / cj
I(ci|cj) = 0 else
According to its definition, I verifies: 0 ≤ I(ci|cj) ≤ 1 and ∀cj criterium
which is not a leaf∑
ci/cj
I(ci|cj) = 1;
– J , the priority of an alternative with respect to a leaf criterium:
J : A× C → [0; 1]
(ai, cj) 7−→ J(ai|cj) = wi ∈Wcj
with cj leaf criterium
J(ai|cj) = 0 else
According to its definition, J verifies: 0 ≤ J(ai|cj) ≤ 1 and ∀cj leaf criterium∑
ai∈A I(ai|cj) = 1;
The extension of these functions corresponding to the transitive closure of
the specificity relation (/∗) is deduced as follows:
– I∗, the priority of a criterium with respect to the criterium on the upper
level:
I∗ : C × C → [0; 1]
(ci, cj) 7−→ I∗(ci|cj) = 0 if ¬(ci /∗ cj)
I∗(ci|cj) = I(ci|cj) if ci / cj
I∗(ci|cj) = I(ci|ck).I∗(ck|cj)
with ci / ck else
We immediately deduce that: 0 ≤ I∗(ci|cj) ≤ 1 and ∀cj not a leaf criterium∑
ci/cj
I∗(ci|cj) = 1
– J∗, the priority of an alternative with respect of a criterium:
J∗ : A× C → [0; 1]
(ai, cj) 7−→ J∗(ai|cj) = J(ai|cj)
if cj is a leaf criterium
J∗(ai|cj) =
∑
ck/
∗cj ,
ck leaf criterium
J(ai|ck).I∗(ck|cj) else
We immediately deduce that: 0 ≤ J∗(ai|cj) ≤ 1 and
∑
ai∈A J
∗(ai|cj) = 1
This decision-modelling measures the consistency of judgments and synthe-
sizes them by providing the following utility function:
pi : A → [0; 1]
ai 7−→ pi(ai) = J(ai|c0)
This utility function is used by the autonomous agent representing user in
automated negotiation.
3 Automated negotiation system
Negotiation could be considered as a process of distributed rational decision mak-
ing following a protocol. In this context, we define the autonomy of negotiating
agents and show the limits of this approach.
3.1 Distributed rational decision making
Game theory defines the economic rationality of agent as making decisions op-
timizing their individual payoff, through an utility function pii which maps each
model of the state of the world to a real number. A non-cooperative negotiation
is a framework where agents may have different goals, and each agent tries to
maximize its own good with no concern for the global good.
Definition 1. Formally, a non-cooperative negotiation consists in the four
components < I,AI , s,ΠI > specialized by the following:
– a set of N agents: I = {1, 2, ..., N};
– a set of alternatives Ai ⊆ Sol considered by the agent i: ai ∈ Ai is the
advocated alternative. Alternatives are represented by the vector
AI = (A1, A2, ..., AN );
– a global decision s, the majority alternative or if some of the alternatives
are equals, determined by lexicographic order;
– for each agent i, a utility function pii, evaluating the payoff of the agent
i with respect to the global decision. Utility functions are represented by the
vector ΠI = (pi1, pi2, ..., piN ).
This approach respects the cognitive scheme of each agent which is determi-
nated by the reference system of its user. The comprehension and judgments of
the problem are subjective.
In this system, negotiation consists in an exchange of proposals between
agents. The agent i proposes its advocate alternative to agent j. This alternative
should be the most preferred alternative for agent j (with the highest priorities
with respect to the goal) to be immediately accepted. If not, agent j tries to
change the preference order of alternatives by adjusting judgments in pairwise
comparison matrixes (cf section 3.2). If the proposal is not accepted, it will
send a counter-proposal. The negotiation will be stopped, when an alternative
is approved unanimously.
3.2 Strategy of negotiating agents
Takayuki Ito and Toramatsu Shintani [3] propose a method to increase the sup-
port of an alternative within the limits of consistency. In the system, an agent
increases the value of elements of the rows of this alternative in the matrix where
this alternative is evaluated except for the diagonal element, within two inter-
vals of the nine point scale in order to increase the weight of the alternative and
change the preference order. Table 1 shows an example of such an adjustment.
Agent increases by 1 interval the value of elements of the alternative a2 over the
alternatives a1 and a3. Figure 3 shows by this adjustment that a2 become more
preferable.
a1 a2 a3 wi
a1 1 1 1 1/3
a2 1 1 1 1/3
a3 1 1 1 1/3
⇒
a1 a2 a3 wi
a1 1 1/2 1 1/4
a2 2 1 2 1/2
a3 1 1/2 1 1/4
Table 1. Adjusting judgments in the matrix Ac3
The rationality of negotiating agents is implemented with a utility function
given by the AHP. Within the limits of the uncertainty of this decision-modelling,
the agent is autonomous of its user for the decision [1].
3.3 The limits of this approach
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [8] shows that no social choice exists with more
than three alternatives (‖Sol‖ ≥ 3). This impossibility to satisfy desiderata con-
ditions (possible aggregation of individual preferences, pareto efficiency, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, no-dictatorship) justify the need of negotiation
support tools to help users during the debate (cf section 4).
Fig. 3. Adjusting judgments in a decision hierarchy
Moreover, the process of adjusting judgments which is called persuasion [3, 4]
is not oriented by a heuristic to find an acceptable alternative. The process can
neither justify the modifications on judgments nor justify the order of these
modifications. Compromises are not relaxations on preferences but help to find
acceptable alternatives which are not found by the AHP.
According to N.R. Jennings [5], argumentation is a way to improve the effi-
ciency of a negotiation process. This assertion can not be formally demonstrated.
The presence of explicit justifications in argumentation could fail to improve con-
vergence and may degrade performance due to processing overheads [6]. Instead
of speeding up the rate of converging to a solution, argumentation can explain
conflicts.
4 Negotiation Support
The system takes advantage of the interaction between users. It provides func-
tionalities to negotiate a joint representation of the problem and to automatically
justify proposals based on this joint representation.
4.1 Collaborative development of decision hierarchy
The AHP can be used successfully with a group. The greater the number of
people involved in the hierarchy construction is , the greater the range of ideas
is. The enumeration of alternatives and the development of decision hierarchy
help the group to debate the problem. This computer-mediated work increases
the comprehension, the readability and, the objectivity of the decision-making.
However judgments remain subjective.
This system provides addition functionalities to negotiate a joint representa-
tion of the problem. All agents (i ∈ I) share the same goal (G = c0) but each of
them has its own set of activities, alternatives (Ai) or criteria (Ci). The sets of
activities can move, expand and, retract during negotiation. When a user takes
into account a new alternative, this alternative is proposed to all users by agents.
A user group is associated with a sub-hierarchy. When a user takes into account
a new criterium, this criterium is proposed to the corresponding group. In the
previous example, ”the social impact” (c6) is a criterium proposed to all users
taking into account ”the durability” (c2). The middle agent registries agents and
their sets of activities.
The problem structure help users to argue their choices. Common criteria
can be used to justify proposals.
4.2 Automated justification
The relative confidence in a criterium taken into account for a decision could
be estimated by the following function:
V : C − {co} → [0; 1]
ci 7−→ V (ci) = I∗(ci|c0)
We immediately deduce that a more general criterium than another is more
confident: if ∀k1, k2 ck1 / ck2 then v(ck2) ≥ v(ck1).
According to Bayes’relation, the contribution of a criterium to an alterna-
tive could be estimated by the following function:
S : C − {co} ×A → [0; 1]
(ci, aj) 7−→ S(ci|aj) = J
∗(aj |ci).V (ci)
pi(aj)
We deduce that a more general criterium than another have a greater con-
tribution:
if ∀k1, k2 ck1 / ck2 then ∀ai ∈ A S(ck2|ai) ≥ S(ck1|ai).
An agent can justify its proposals. Each proposed alternative is supported
by a criterium in accordance with a force. The set of arguments have two kinds
of relations:
– a specificity relation over criteria not depending on the alternative is defined
as: ck1 / ck2 iff ck1 is a sub-criteria of ck2;
– a set of preference relations over criteria depending on the alternative:
ck3 al ck4 iff P (ck3|al) ≥ P (ck4|al).
Example 1. The second decision hierarchy in the figure 3 have the following
specificity relation:
c1/c0, c2/c0, c3/c1, c4/c1, c5/c1, c6/c2, c7/c2 The preference relation depending
on a2 is such as:
c0[P (c0|a2) = 1] a2 c2[P (c2|a2) = 0.795] a2
c7[P (c7|a2) = 0.734] a2 c1[P (c1|a2) = 0.204] a2
c4[P (c4|a4) = 0.163] a2 c6[P (c6|a2) = 0.061] a2
c3[P (c3|a2) = 0.02] 'a2 c5[P (c5|a2) = 0.02]
A message to make a proposal consists of an alternative and the set of ar-
guments supporting it. The middle agent filters and transmits this message to
agents sharing the same activities. If agents share some criteria, the strongest
criterium, except for roots, is selected. This argument is transmitted by agents
to users in order to explain the conflict. It points at the criterium from which
the conflict comes from.
5 Conclusions
The functionalities for negotiation support take advantage of interactions be-
tween users. When a criterium is pointed by a conflict, the system encourages
users to split criterium in sub-criteria.
As Florania Grasso [2], we think that conflicts are not only beneficial but
also necessary and welcomed to make a better choice. Despite advices [2], the
arguing agent does not base its justification on the audience’s beliefs. It uses
common criteria in accordance with a force determined by its own judgments.
The relevance of arguments is based on the preferences of the arguing agent.
An implementation and an empirical assessment must come to valid the ad-
equacy and the significance of our approach.
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